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THE KNOWLEDGE GAP IN WORKPLACE 
RETIREMENT INVESTING AND THE ROLE OF 
PROFESSIONAL ADVISORS 
JILL E. FISCH† 
TESS WILKINSON-RYAN†† 
KRISTIN FIRTH††† 
ABSTRACT 
  The dramatic shift from traditional pension plans to participant-
directed 401(k) plans has increased the obligation of individual 
investors to take responsibility for their own retirement planning. With 
this shift comes increasing evidence that investors are making poor 
investment decisions. 
  This Article seeks to uncover the reasons for poor investment 
decisions. We use a simulated retirement investing task and a new 
financial literacy index to evaluate the role of financial literacy in 
retirement investment decisionmaking in a group of nonexpert 
participants. Our results suggest that individual employees often lack 
the skills necessary to support the current model of participant-directed 
investing. We show that less knowledgeable participants allocate too 
little money to equity, engage in naive diversification, fail to identify 
dominated funds, and are inattentive to fees. Over the duration of a 
retirement account, these mistakes can cost investors hundreds of 
thousands of dollars. 
  We then explore the capacity of professional advisors to mitigate this 
problem. Using the same study with a group of professional advisors, 
we document a predictable but nonetheless dramatic knowledge gap 
Copyright © 2016 Jill E. Fisch, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, and Kristin Firth. 
       †     Perry Golkin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. We are grateful 
for thoughtful comments from Jonah Gelbach and the extensive research assistance provided by 
Jackie Hamilton, Penn Law Class of 2014. We are also grateful to Patricia Albrecht and Chip 
Jones for coordinating our access to the broker-subjects through the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Association. Prior drafts of this Article were presented at the ETH - Paris 1/ESCP 
Law & Finance Seminar, the Tel Aviv University Law & Economics workshop, the University of 
Texas Law & Economics seminar, the Berkeley Faculty Workshop, and the poster session of the 
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies and we received many helpful comments from the 
participants.  
      ††     Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
    †††     J.D. 2016, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
FISCH, WILKINSON-RYAN & FIRTH IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2016  7:19 PM 
634 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:633 
between professionals and ordinary investors. The professional 
advisors were far more financially literate and made better choices 
among investment alternatives. Our results highlight the potential value 
of professional advice in mitigating the effects of financial illiteracy in 
retirement planning. Our findings suggest that, in weighing the costs of 
heightened regulation against the value of reducing possible conflicts 
of interest, regulators need to be sensitive to the knowledge gap. 
INTRODUCTION 
The workers of the next generation face a new challenge—saving 
for their own retirement. In the past, workers were able to rely on a 
combination of employer-provided pensions, also known as defined-
benefit plans, and social security. Today the vast majority of workers 
will have to depend on the balances in their 401(k) plans and individual 
retirement accounts (IRAs)—plans in which they are individually 
responsible for choosing both how much money to save for retirement 
and how to allocate that money among a range of investment options. 
Participant-directed retirement-savings plans may increase employee 
autonomy and reduce the potential that employees will be the victim 
of pension-plan underfunding or employer conflicts of interest. There 
are reasons to think, however, that the task is so complex that most 
retail investors make predictable and systematic mistakes at a real cost 
to their financial well-being.1 Indeed, commentators report that the 
shift to employee-directed retirement savings has resulted in “the 
greatest retirement crisis in history” in which many elderly Americans 
will have insufficient retirement savings to meet their needs.2 
Solutions to these problems are highly contested. One possible 
response is improved disclosure—the dominant approach to investor 
protection reflected in the federal securities laws.3 Yet it is unclear 
 
 1. See, e.g., JODI DICENZO, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 301 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND RETIREMENT PLAN CONTRIBUTIONS: HOW PARTICIPANTS 
BEHAVE, AND PRESCRIPTIVE SOLUTIONS 7 (2007) (“Optimal retirement saving and investing are 
complex tasks that may easily exceed boundaries of rational capability.”); Jill E. Fisch & Tess 
Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? An Experiment on Mutual Fund 
Choice, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 605, 643–44 (2014) (finding that investors pay limited attention to fees 
and engage in naive diversification). 
 2. Edward Siedle, The Greatest Retirement Crisis in American History, FORBES  
(Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/edwardsiedle/2013/03/20/the-greatest-retirement-
crisis-in-american-history [https://perma.cc/KY8Y-65AE]. 
 3. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 417–18 (2003) (“A demanding 
system of mandatory disclosure, which has become more demanding in the aftermath of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, makes up the core of the federal securities laws.”). The U.S. 
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whether disclosure is useful to investors who do not understand the 
task at hand or the material they must evaluate. Some commentators 
have called for more investor education to increase financial literacy 
and, indeed, a variety of organizations are focusing their efforts on 
investor education.4 To date, however, studies have found that investor 
education has limited value in improving investing performance.5  
Another option is more extensive regulation. The Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Tibble v. Edison International,6 which 
imposed a continuing duty on the part of employers to monitor and 
improve the investment options they offer in 401(k) plans, is an 
example.7 The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) took a similar 
approach in adopting its 2016 fiduciary rule, which mandates greater 
compliance obligations for those who provide investment advice in 
connection with retirement plans.8 
Retirement investing presents particular regulatory challenges 
because the core principles are themselves contested.9 Commentators 
do not agree on the appropriate amount of retirement savings,10 the 
acceptable degree of risk for a retirement portfolio,11 or the return that 
workers should expect to earn over the course of their lifetimes.12 
 
Department of Labor (DOL) has also emphasized increased disclosure. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, Fact Sheet: Final Rule to Improve Transparency of Fees and Expenses to Workers in 
401(k)-Type Retirement Plans (Feb. 2012), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fsparticipantfeerule.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A54A-VXWZ]. 
 4. See infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text (describing these efforts). 
 5. See infra note 52 (citing studies). 
 6. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823 (2015). 
 7. Id. at 1828. 
 8. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 6, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 2509, 2510, 2550). 
 9. See, e.g., J.J. Zhang & Daniel Zolin, Is There a Case for Actively Managed Funds?, WALL 
STREET J. (Mar. 1, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/are-index-funds-really-better-than-actively
-managed-1425271058 [https://perma.cc/543B-PLGR] (presenting arguments on both sides of the 
debate over actively managed versus index funds). 
 10. See, e.g., Tom Anderson, How Much Do You Really Need for Retirement?, CNBC (Sept. 
21, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/21/how-much-do-you-really-need-for-retirement.html 
[https://perma.cc/PP8A-UUPR] (reporting varying perspectives as to an appropriate retirement-
savings target). 
 11. See, e.g., Daniel Gardner & Kevin Knowles, The Date Debate Revisited: Evidence 
Continues to Support a Flat Glide Path in Retirement, RUSSELL INVS. (May 2015), 
https://russellinvestments.com/us/insights/articles/the-date-debate-revisited [https://perma.cc/77
VJ-UEQ8] (recounting debate within the investment community about the appropriate asset 
allocation of target-date funds at the target retirement date).  
 12. See Carla Fried, That Retirement Calculator May Be Lying to You, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 
2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-10-03/that-retirement-calculator-may-be-
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Economic fluctuations can change the relative payoffs of different 
investment choices, and financial innovation continues to produce new 
and complex products for investors to evaluate.13 Scholars debate the 
effectiveness of market forces in disciplining the fees associated with 
professional advice.14 At the same time, a particular employee’s needs 
may be driven by individualized factors.15 In light of these challenges, 
it is difficult to set appropriate objectives for workplace financial 
literacy, to determine what type of guidance to provide to workers, or 
even to evaluate the quality of an individual worker or retirement 
plan’s investment choices.16 
A necessary first step for addressing these challenges is 
understanding the process better. Specifically, it is necessary to identify 
the particular mistakes that ordinary investors make and why they 
make those mistakes.17 To analyze these questions, we construct and 
apply a new financial literacy index, using questions tailored to the task 
of choosing among investment options in an employer-sponsored 
retirement plan. We consider the role of financial literacy in addition 
to standard demographic characteristics, investor numeracy, and risk 
aversion. 
Our study supports the critical explanatory power of financial 
literacy reported by other work in this field. Financial literacy, 
measured through our index, is the strongest predictor of investment 
decisionmaking measured across multiple dimensions. Although age, 
gender, education, and investing experience are all highly correlated, 
 
lying-to-you [https://perma.cc/3ZHD-SHA2] (citing a “wide range” of predicted return estimates 
used in retirement planning). 
 13. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1961, 2022 (2010) (explaining the complexities of target-date funds). 
 14. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 26–27, Jones 
v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2009) (No. 08-586) (citing studies showing lack of market 
discipline for mutual fund advisory fees). But see Brief for the Investment Company Institute as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27–28, Jones, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (No. 08-586) (citing 
evidence that mutual fund investors are highly responsive to advisory fees). 
 15. Anderson, supra note 10. 
 16. See, e.g., Dodge & Cox, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on the Definition of the 
Term “Fiduciary” (July 17, 2015), https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-ZA25-00068.pdf [https://
perma.cc/395P-PUC9] (criticizing the proposed rule for its preference for low-cost index funds 
and observing that “mutual funds with the lowest fees do not necessarily represent the highest 
quality investments for retirement investors”). 
 17. Our work addresses some of the questions raised by our earlier research, which 
documented costly mistakes made by investors in retirement planning. See generally Fisch & 
Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 1 (reporting results of an earlier study). The study described in this 
Article demonstrates the connection between these mistakes and financial literacy. 
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financial literacy is a strong predictor of returns even holding these 
demographic variables constant. That is, financial literacy matters even 
within demographic categories. Men or women, young or old, people 
make better retirement investment choices when they know something 
about the options available to them—including what an index fund is, 
what a bond fund is, and which investments are associated with higher 
or lower risk and returns. 
By drilling down into the decisionmaking process, our study sheds 
new light on the reasons why ordinary investors make costly mistakes. 
We show that financially illiterate investors allocate too little money to 
equity, engage in naive diversification, fail to identify dominated 
funds,18 and are inattentive to fees. These mistakes can be costly.19 For 
example, merely investing $10,000 in an equity fund with a 2 percent 
instead of a 1 percent expense ratio will cost an investor a difference of 
$28,000 over a thirty-year investment. 
One method of addressing these limitations is through the 
assistance of professional advisors. In the retirement industry, 
professional advisors serve a variety of functions: they advise 
businesses on how to set up appropriate 401(k) plans, they provide 
investor education to employees eligible to participate in such plans, 
and they provide advice to retail investors outside the employment 
context such as regarding IRAs.20 Although the issues of high advisory 
fees and conflicts of interest have generated extensive controversy 
about the role and incentives of professional advisors,21 research has 
 
 18. We draw upon the concept of dominated funds developed in Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, 
Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 
401(k) Plans, 124 YALE L.J. 1346 (2015) (explaining the concept of dominated funds in 401(k) 
plans). Ayres and Curtis define dominated funds as “choices in the plan menu that have an 
optimal portfolio weight of less than 1% and that are more than fifty basis points more expensive 
than either (i) funds in the same style offered in the menu or (ii) an average of similarly styled 
funds in the marketplace.” Id. at 1481. We use a simplified approach to dominated funds here. 
See infra Part III.B.2.  
 19. See, e.g., Anne Tergesen, 401(k) Fees, Already Low, Are Heading Lower, WALL  
STREET J. (May 15, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/401-k-fees-already-low-are-heading-
lower-1463304601 [https://perma.cc/D82Y-L5MM] (reporting that “[a]ccording to Vanguard 
Group, investors in a plan that charged 0.25% a year could in theory amass 20% more money 
over a four-decade career than they could in one that charged 1.25%, all else being equal”). 
 20. OLIVER WYMAN, INC., THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL ADVISORS IN THE U.S. RETIREMENT 
MARKET (2015), http://fsroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/The-role-of-financial-
advisors-in-the-US-retirement-market-Oliver-Wyman.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4P4-L32W]. 
 21. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE EFFECTS OF 
CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE ON RETIREMENT SAVINGS (2015) (explaining that “advisers’ 
conflicts of interest are quantitatively significant and erode households’ retirement assets by 
billions of dollars each year”). 
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not addressed the threshold question—whether investment 
professionals can in fact improve the quality of retirement planning. 
In this Article, we address the capacity of professional advisors to 
mitigate the problem of poor financial literacy. With the assistance of 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Association (FINRA),22 we enlisted 
a group of professional advisors to participate in our study. Our results 
document a predictable but nonetheless dramatic knowledge gap 
between professionals and ordinary investors at a basic level of 
understanding. The professional advisors were overwhelmingly more 
financially literate than even the more literate ordinary investors. 
Similarly, the professional advisors performed better across a variety 
of dimensions at the task of choosing among investment alternatives. 
The reasons the professional advisors performed better are 
particularly important. Professional advisors, unlike ordinary 
investors, recognized that appropriate asset allocation was a key 
component of retirement investing, understood the importance of 
allocating money to equities over a long-term investment horizon, and, 
to a large degree, correctly identified and rejected inferior investment 
options. 
Our results identify a potential value of professional advice in 
mitigating the effects of financial illiteracy in retirement planning. As 
a result, our study has important implications for regulation of 
retirement investing and, in particular, the DOL’s 2016 fiduciary rule.23 
Our findings suggest the need for regulators to be sensitive to the 
knowledge gap in weighing the costs of heightened regulation against 
the value of reducing possible conflicts of interest. 
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides a brief overview 
of the background literature on financial literacy and the regulatory 
context to which our study is directed. Part II describes our study’s 
structure and the construct of our financial literacy index. Part III 
reports our findings about the role of financial literacy in investor 
decisionmaking. Part IV considers the implications of our findings and 
documents the potential value to retail investors of receiving access to 
professional investment advice. 
 
 22. FINRA is a nongovernmental self-regulatory organization that oversees the brokerage 
industry. FINRA, About FINRA, http://www.finra.org/about [https://perma.cc/77F3-TGFS]. As 
of September, 2016, FINRA regulated approximately 3,895 securities firms with approximately 
641,761 brokers. http://finra.org/newsroom/statistics [https://perma.cc/34N7-N543].  
 23. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment 
Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 6, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 2509, 2510, 2550). For 
an explanation of the 2016 fiduciary rule, see infra notes 76–83 and accompanying text.  
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I.  BACKGROUND 
A. The Role of Financial Literacy 
An extensive body of research reports that consumers lack basic 
financial literacy.24 At the outset, as scholars concede, this observation 
is overly simplistic in that financial literacy can be defined in various 
ways.25 As one paper has observed, many definitions incorporate both 
knowledge of financial concepts and the skills necessary to apply that 
knowledge to the task at hand.26 Evaluating financial literacy may also 
be context specific: the necessary skills and knowledge vary according 
to the task. This Article examines financial literacy in the context of 
investment decisionmaking, and in particular its role in retirement 
planning. 
Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia Mitchell have conducted the most 
extensive and best-known research on financial literacy. Most of their 
work uses a financial literacy assessment instrument consisting of three 
questions.27 Lusardi and Mitchell, working together and with others, 
have incorporated these three questions into a large number of surveys 
 
 24. E.g., Editorial, Improving Financial Literacy Is Essential to Our Nation’s Economic 
Health, TIME (Apr. 9, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/04/09/op-ed-improving-financial-
literacy-is-essential-to-our-nations-economic-health [https://perma.cc/Z978-HNXX]. 
 25. See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Economic Importance of Financial 
Literacy: Theory and Evidence, 52 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5, 6 (2014) [hereinafter Lusardi & 
Mitchell, Economic Importance] (defining financial literacy as “peoples’ ability to process 
economic information and make informed decisions about financial planning, wealth 
accumulation, debt, and pensions”). 
 26. See Angela A. Hung, Andrew M. Parker & Joanne K. Yoong, Defining and Measuring 
Financial Literacy, (RAND Labor and Population Working Paper Series, WR-708, 2009), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1498674 [https://perma.cc/829P-8CNC]. 
 27. See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Planning: 
Implications for Retirement Wellbeing, in FINANCIAL LITERACY: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
RETIREMENT SECURITY AND THE FINANCIAL MARKETPLACE 17, 39 (2012) [hereinafter Lusardi 
& Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Planning]; Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Planning 
and Financial Literacy: How Do Women Fare?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 413, 413–14 (2008) 
[hereinafter Lusardi & Mitchell, How Do Women Fare?]. The questions are: 
• Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5 
years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow: 
[more than $102, exactly $102, less than $102? Do not know; refuse to answer]. 
• Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 
2% per year. After 1 year, would you be able to buy: [more than, exactly the same as, or less 
than today with the money in this account? Do not know; refuse to answer]. 
• Do you think that the following statement is true or false? “Buying a single company stock 
usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.” [True, false, do not know; refuse 
to answer]. 
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in the United States and throughout the world.28 Their bottom-line 
conclusion is that “financial literacy can play a key role on both saving 
and portfolio choice.”29 
The Lusardi and Mitchell test has been highly influential. They 
and other scholars added to the three basic questions in some cases.30 
Other scholars have introduced their own measures of financial 
literacy.31 A common finding among the extensive literature is that 
levels of financial literacy are low.32 
Commentators cite research linking low financial literacy to a 
wide variety of costly financial mistakes, including the failure to save 
adequately, the use of expensive sources of credit, and the failure to 
obtain and use information about various financial products.33 For 
example, Lusardi and Mitchell found that women who exhibit lower 
 
 28. Lusardi & Mitchell, Economic Importance, supra note 25, at 10 (describing the use of 
these three questions in various surveys).  
 29. Lusardi & Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Planning, supra note 27, at 35.  
 30. See, e.g., Jere R. Behrman, Olivia S. Mitchell, Cindy K. Soo & David Bravo, How 
Financial Literacy Affects Household Wealth Accumulation, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 300, 301 (2012) 
(using a “rich set of 12 questions” to study financial literacy in Chile); Maarten C.J. van Rooij, 
Annamaria Lusardi & Rob J.M. Alessie, Financial Literacy, Retirement Planning and Household 
Wealth, 122 ECON. J. 449 (2012) [hereinafter van Rooij et al., Household Wealth] (using a five-
factor test); Maarten C.J. van Rooij, Annamaria Lusardi, & Rob Alessie, Financial Literacy and 
Stock Market Participation, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 449 (2011) [hereinafter van Rooij et al., Stock 
Market Participation] (also using a five-factor test); see also Antonia Grohmann, Roy 
Kouwenberg and Lukas Menkhoff, Financial Literacy and Its Consequences in the Emerging 
Middle Class (Kiel Inst. for the World Econ. Working Papers, No. 1943, 2014), https://www.ifw-
members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/financial-literacy-and-its-consequences-in-the-emerging-midd
le-class/KWP%201943.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2Q6-CWEK] (using a three-question test to 
measure financial literacy in Bangkok but adding a fourth question asking subjects to name 
foreign banks that operate in Thailand). 
 31. See, e.g., Daniel Fernandes, John G. Lynch, Jr. & Richard G. Netemeyer, The Effect of 
Financial Literacy and Financial Education on Downstream Financial Behaviors, 60 MGMT. SCI. 
1861 (2014) (challenging previous measures of financial literacy and substituting its own thirteen-
question scale); Marianne A. Hilgert, Jeanne M. Hogarth, and Sondra G. Beverly, Household 
Financial Management: The Connection Between Knowledge and Behavior, FED. RES. BULL. 309 
(2003), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/0703lead.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QNY-
DX5A] (using twenty-eight pass–fail questions); Sebastian Müller & Martin Weber, Financial 
Literacy and Mutual Fund Investments: Who Buys Actively Managed Funds?, 62 SCHMALENBACH 
BUS. REV. 126, 128 (2010) (using an eight-question quiz). See generally Hung et al., supra note 26, 
at tbl.2 (listing studies measuring financial literacy and describing structure of assessment and 
number of questions asked). 
 32. See, e.g., Lusardi & Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Planning, supra note 27, at 34 
(reporting “widespread financial illiteracy among older Americans”).  
 33. See William Gale & Ruth Levine, Financial Literacy: What Works? How Could It Be 
More Effective, 72 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 39, 40 (2012) (describing some of the “abundant 
evidence” relating financial literacy to financial mistakes). 
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levels of financial literacy are less likely to plan for retirement.34 
Behrman and others found that financial literacy was positively 
correlated with household wealth and that the effects of literacy were 
“more important than schooling for explaining variation in household 
wealth and pension contributions.”35 Van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 
found those with lower levels of financial literacy are less likely to 
invest in stocks.36 
Regulators have also researched financial literacy. FINRA’s 
Investor Education Foundation attempted to measure financial 
literacy through a five-question study—the National Financial 
Capability Study—which is simply the Lusardi five-question survey.37 
Of the five multiple-choice questions, which address compounding, 
inflation, mortgages, diversification, and the relationship between 
interest rates and bond prices, FINRA’s subjects answered an average 
of 2.88 questions correctly.38 From these results, FINRA concluded, 
“Americans demonstrate relatively low levels of financial literacy and 
have difficulty applying financial decisionmaking skills to real life 
situations.”39 
The Dodd-Frank Act40 directed the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to examine investor financial literacy,41 and the 
SEC reported its results in a report in 2012.42 The report relied upon a 
review of existing quantitative studies of financial literacy conducted 
by the Library of Congress43 as well as online testing of investor 
understanding of various SEC-mandated disclosure documents.44 The 
 
 34. Lusardi & Mitchell, How Do Women Fare?, supra note 27, at 415–16.  
 35. Behrman et al., supra note 30, at 303.  
 36. van Rooij et al., Stock Market Participation, supra note 30, at 450. 
 37. FINRA INV’R EDUC. FOUND., Take the Financial Literacy Quiz, http://www.usfinancial
capability.org/quiz.php [https://perma.cc/QZ7U-JVC6]. 
 38. See Kimberly Palmer, How to Measure Your Financial Literacy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP.: MONEY (June 20, 2014, 9:23 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/alpha-consumer/
2014/06/20/how-to-measure-your-financial-literacy [https://perma.cc/PJH3-JWA4] (using these 
questions to describe results of FINRA’s survey of 25,000 adults in 2009 and 2012). 
 39. See FINRA INV’R EDUC. FOUND., U.S. Survey Data at a Glance, http://www.usfinancial
capability.org/results.php?region=US [https://perma.cc/G93U-TR8W] (reporting survey results). 
 40. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered titles of the U.S. Code). 
 41. Id. § 917. 
 42. SEC, Study Regarding Financial Literacy Among Investors (2012), https://www.sec.gov/
news/studies/2012/917-financial-literacy-study-part1.pdf [https://perma.cc/LRS2-PM25]. 
 43. Id. at vii.  
 44. Id. at ix. 
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SEC, like FINRA, concluded, “American investors lack basic financial 
literacy.”45 
Scholars and policymakers are attempting to respond to evidence 
of poor consumer investment decisions by improving consumer 
financial education.46 For example, the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (CFPB) has identified as one of its objectives developing tools 
for more effective investor education.47 Similarly, on June 25, 2013, 
President Obama signed an executive order establishing the 
President’s Advisory Council on Financial Capability for Young 
Americans.48 The Council, led by the U.S. Treasury Department, 
evaluates the financial capability of young people and develops tools 
to improve their capabilities.49 The Schwab Foundation, under the 
leadership of Carrie Schwab-Pomerantz, has worked to develop 
investor-education programs for more than thirty years.50 As Schwab-
Pomerantz explains: “[F]inancial education can change lives.”51 
For investor education to improve financial decisionmaking, 
however, two things must be true. First, a lack of financial literacy must 
be a contributing cause of poor investor decisions. Second, investor 
education must be effective in improving financial literacy. This Article 
focuses primarily on the first question; our future work will focus on 
the second.52  
 
 45. Id. 
 46. See, e.g., Gale & Levine, supra note 33. 
 47. See Richard Cordray, Dir. of the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Address at the  
FINRA Investor Education Conference (May 29, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
newsroom/director-cordray-remarks-at-the-finra-investor-education-conference [https://perma.
cc/Z2XN-DDHZ] (describing the CFPB’s investor education efforts). 
 48. Exec. Order No. 13,646, 3 C.F.R. 308 (2014).  
 49. Cyrus Amir-Mokri, President Obama Creates New Advisory Council Focused on the 
Financial Capability of Young Americans, TREASURY NOTES (June 25, 2013), http://www. 
treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/President-Obama-Creates-New-Advisory-Council-Focused-on-
the-Financial-Capability-of-Young-Americans.aspx [https://perma.cc/H536-U7S5].  
 50. Carrie Schwab-Pomerantz, CHARLES SCHWAB, http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/
resource_center/expert_insight/schwab_experts/carrie_schwab_pomerantz.html [https://perma.
cc/9JQD-A5FP].  
 51. Andrew S. Ross, Schwab-Pomerantz: Visionary Wants Financial Security for All, 
SFGATE (Feb. 26, 2015, 5:16 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/visionsf/article/Schwab-Pomerantz-
Visionary-wants-financial-6039360.php [https://perma.cc/V5B9-YH3A]. 
 52. To date, studies have questioned the effectiveness of investor education in addressing 
poor financial literacy. See, e.g., Fernandes et al., supra note 31, at 1872 (conducting meta-analysis 
of 168 papers on financial education and finding that “financial education interventions studied 
explained only about 0.1% of the variance in the financial behaviors studied, with even weaker 
average effects of interventions directed at low-income rather than general population samples”); 
Lewis Mandell & Linda Schmid Klein, The Impact of Financial Literacy Education on Subsequent 
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B. Financial Literacy, Regulation, and Retirement Investing 
The role of financial literacy is particularly important in the 
context of retirement savings.53 Over the past forty years, retirement-
savings plans have shifted almost entirely from employer-directed 
plans to those in which individual workers make their own savings and 
investment decisions.54 This shift has resulted in many workers lacking 
sufficient savings at the time of retirement. Critics attribute the 
problem, in part, to poor decisions by plan participants and by those 
employees who choose not to participate at all.55 Studies suggest that 
participants in workplace retirement plans make numerous mistakes, 
including saving too little,56 choosing suboptimal investment options,57 
and paying excessive fees.58 Understanding the contribution of 
financial literacy to poor investment decisions is critical to the policy 
choices around whether and how to regulate. 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 
regulates most employee benefit plans, including employer-provided 
retirement plans.59 ERISA’s mandates are implemented primarily by 
 
Financial Behavior, 20 J. FIN. COUNSELING & PLAN. 15, 18 (2009) (finding high-school financial 
education course did not improve financial behavior); Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy 
Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 201 (2008) (arguing that financial education is too costly and 
thus not an effective tool for improving the average American’s financial decsionmaking). 
 53. See generally Lusardi & Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Planning, supra note 27 
(studying financial literacy among older Americans and its implications for retirement planning). 
 54. Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 1, at 614. 
 55. See, e.g., Jeff Rose, 4 Serious Retirement Plan Errors to Avoid, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP.: MONEY (Mar. 9, 2015, 10:08 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/on-
retirement/2015/03/09/4-serious-retirement-plan-errors-to-avoid [https://perma.cc/Y6K3-3VSC]. 
 56. See James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, $100 Bills on the Sidewalk: 
Suboptimal Investment in 401(k) Plans, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 748, 760–61 (2011). 
 57. See Nina Tang, Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary R. Mottola & Stephen P. Utkus, The Efficiency 
of Sponsor and Participant Portfolio Choices in 401(k) Plans, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 1073, 1073–74 
(2010) (finding that investors construct inefficient portfolios, reducing their potential retirement 
wealth by one fifth); ALICIA A. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDEN, CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT 
BOSTON COLL., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 43, 401(K) PLANS ARE STILL COMING UP SHORT  
4–5 (2006), http://crr.bc.edu/briefs/401k-plans-are-still-coming-up-short [https://perma.cc/VX47-
GNAH] (outlining various poor investment decisions, including failure to diversify, an 
overinvestment in company stock, and a failure to rebalance). 
 58. Josh Boak & Paul Wiseman, High Fees Eroding Many 401(k) Retirement Accounts, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS: THE BIG STORY (Sept. 13, 2014, 1:37 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
savers-beware-fees-may-be-shrinking-your-401k [https://perma.cc/M3LL-S3SM].  
 59. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 80 
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C). 
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the DOL.60 Regulation of retirement investing reflects a tension 
between two policy objectives. On the one hand, the DOL has 
attempted to address deficiencies in the structure of retirement plans 
and in employee use of such plans by imposing mandatory 
requirements on plans and plan providers.61 On the other hand, wary 
perhaps of the pitfalls of mandating a specific retirement strategy or 
product, the regulations privilege investor autonomy.62 
The law recognizes the critical role that employers and other 
intermediaries play in retirement investing. Specifically, ERISA is 
structured around the concept of a fiduciary.63 Under ERISA, a person 
becomes a fiduciary by giving investment advice, exercising 
discretionary authority over the management of a retirement plan, 
exercising control over plan assets, or having discretionary authority 
over a plan’s administration.64 A person can also become a fiduciary by 
providing investment advice for a fee.65 
Under ERISA, fiduciaries are subject to strict regulation, 
including mandated legal obligations, transaction restrictions, and 
liability exposure.66 Employers who might otherwise be subject to this 
 
 60. See Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans  
Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 4 (2000) (“[T]he Department of 
Labor . . . interpret[s] and appl[ies] ERISA’s statutory provisions.”). 
 61. For example, employers have obligations to construct plans consisting of an appropriate 
mix of investment alternatives, to administer the plan properly, to make a variety of disclosures, 
including disclosure of fee information, and to avoid conflicts of interest. See, e.g., LaRue v. 
DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008) (recognizing potential employer liability for 
“fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant’s individual account”); 
Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 336 (8th Cir. 2014) (imposing liability on plan fiduciaries for 
allowing the plan to pay excessive recordkeeping fees); Scott Mayland, Note, Ratcheting Up the 
Duty: The Department of Labor’s Misguided Attempt to Impose a Paternalistic Model upon 
Defined Contribution Plans Through ERISA, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 645, 646 (2014) (criticizing the 
paternalism imposed through DOL’s fiduciary duty approach). See generally Anne Tucker, 
Retirement Revolution: Unmitigated Risks in the Defined Contribution Society, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 
153 (2013) (describing employer obligations under ERISA). 
 62. See, e.g., Dana M. Muir, Choice Architecture and the Locus of Fiduciary Obligation in 
Defined Contribution Plans, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1, 14–16 (2013) (explaining how both the decision 
to participate and the choice among investment alternatives have been regarded as employee 
decisions by both regulators and commentators); see also Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 1, 
at 618 (observing that courts have frequently accepted alleged deficiencies among investment 
options so long as plan offered participants a sufficient number of alternatives). 
 63. See Medill, supra note 60, at 27 (“ERISA’s statutory scheme is built around the concept 
of a ‘fiduciary.’”). 
 64. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i), (iii) (2012).  
 65. Id. § 1002(21)(A)(ii). 
 66. Among other things, ERISA prohibits fiduciaries from all conflicts of interest absent an 
explicit exemption. ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). This standard has come to be 
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standard can limit the scope of their fiduciary obligations, however, if 
they delegate investment responsibility to plan participants in 
accordance with the DOL’s requirements.67 Specifically, an employer 
is relieved of fiduciary responsibility for investment losses experienced 
by its employees if the plan participants exercise independent control 
over their investment decisions.68 
Notably, the 404(c) regulations do not limit the employer’s 
obligation to construct an appropriate plan. In Tibble, the Supreme 
Court held that ERISA fiduciaries have a continuing duty to monitor 
the quality of the investment options offered in their 401(k) plans and 
must remove imprudent options from the plan.69 Although the decision 
was narrow and did not specify the scope of this monitoring function, 
it focused increased attention on the important role played by plan 
fiduciaries.70 
ERISA permits employers and other advisors to provide investor 
education but draws a strict distinction between education and 
investment advice: provision of the latter subjects the provider to 
fiduciary obligations. The line between the two is unclear.71 Previously, 
ERISA created a substantial risk that investor education would be 
treated as the provision of investment advice and subject employers to 
fiduciary obligations, leading employers to refrain from any effort to 
educate plan participants.72 The Pension Protection Act of 2006 
 
known as ERISA’s exclusive benefit rule. See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s 
Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1108 (1988). 
 67. DOL regulations provide that in a plan that “provides for individual accounts and 
permits a participant . . . to exercise control over the assets in his account, if a  
participant . . . exercises control over the assets . . . no person who is otherwise a fiduciary shall 
be liable under this part for any loss . . . which results from such participant’s . . . exercise of 
control.” See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2015). These provisions are known as the 404(c) 
regulations. To qualify for this protection, the plan must provide that the employees exercise 
control, have sufficient information to make informed investment decisions, and have access to 
“a broad range of investment alternatives.” Id. Employers, however, are treated as fiduciaries if 
they provide their employees with investment advice. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii). 
 68. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 
 69. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828 (2015). 
 70. Blaine F. Aikin, Ramifications of Supreme Court Decision on 401(k) Fee Lawsuit Run 
Deep, INV. NEWS: FIDUCIARY CORNER (June 1, 2015, 10:43 AM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150601/FREE/150609998/ramifications-of-supreme-
court-decision-on-401-k-fee-lawsuit-run-deep [https://perma.cc/NDH7-W3UQ]. 
 71. See Mayland, supra note 61, at 670 (explaining that, even after the PPA, “the line 
between the provision of advice and education is still not clear”). 
 72. See, e.g., Medill, supra note 60, at 46 (explaining employer reluctance to provide investor 
education as a product of DOL policy); Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment 
Advice and Investment Education: Is No Advice Really the Best Advice?, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
FISCH, WILKINSON-RYAN & FIRTH IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2016  7:19 PM 
646 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:633 
responded to this problem by creating an explicit exemption designed 
to encourage educational programs.73 Some commentators have 
argued that the statute should go further and impose an affirmative 
obligation on employers to provide investor education.74 Employees 
would likely be receptive: one recent study reported, “89 percent of 
employees want their employer to make personal financial planning 
advice available.”75 
On April 6, 2016, the DOL released its long-awaited fiduciary 
rule.76 The rule was adopted in response to ongoing criticism of the high 
cost of conflicts of interest by those who provide investment advice in 
connection with retirement plans.77 It responds by heightening the 
 
LAB. L. 1, 21 (2002) (observing that an employer that provides too much information may be 
deemed to have provided investment advice). 
 73. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1108(g) (2012); I.R.C. § 4975 (2012); Pension Protection Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.); 
29 C.F.R. § 2550.408(g)-1 (2015); Regina T. Jefferson, Increasing Coverage in Today’s Private 
Retirement System, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 463, 483 (2014). Prior to the enactment of the PPA, 
Congress and the DOL engaged in several other initiatives designed to increase investor 
education. See Medill, supra note 60, at 50–51 (describing and critiquing these initiatives).  
 74. See, e.g., Jefferson, supra note 73, at 483–44 (proposing a mandatory education 
requirement for all employers that sponsor 401(k) plans). 
 75. 401k Trends: Employers Respond to Workers’ Desire for Advice, Personalized Education, 
Improved Plans, 401khelpcenter.com, http://www.401khelpcenter.com/401k_education/trends_
education_and_investment_advice.html [https://perma.cc/8T9L-Q7DB] (citing CIGNA study).  
 76. See supra note 8. Congress required the SEC to study the effectiveness of the regulations 
governing brokers and investment advisors as part of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010. Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 913, 124 Stat. 1376, 
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). The statute authorized 
the SEC to adopt a fiduciary standard for brokers. Id. The SEC staff conducted a study and, in 
2011, released a recommendation that the agency adopt a unified fiduciary standard applicable to 
both brokers and investment advisors. STAFF OF THE U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 110–28 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SZR-QDEW]. To date, the SEC has failed to 
adopt a fiduciary standard. See, e.g., Justin Baer & Andrew Ackerman, SEC Head Backs 
Fiduciary Standards for Brokers, Advisers, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 17, 2015, 4:59 PM), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/sec-head-seeks-uniformity-in-fiduciary-duties-among-brokers-advisers-1426607
955 [https://perma.cc/3ERE-CDSV] (reporting that action on adopting a fiduciary standard at the 
SEC has “stalled” “in part because of the complexity of the law”).  
 77. In February 2015, the White House Council of Economic Advisers released an analysis 
reporting that conflicted advice from brokers costs investors $17 billion per year. COUNCIL OF 
ECON. ADVISERS, THE EFFECTS OF CONFLICTED INVESTMENT ADVICE ON RETIREMENT 
SAVINGS 26 (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/cea_coi_report_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HFM7-NWVD]. President Obama responded by calling upon the DOL to move 
forward with a rulemaking proposal that would heighten the regulatory restrictions imposed on 
brokers who provide advice in connection with retirement investing, citing the need for 
retirement advisors to “put the best interests of their clients above their own financial interests.” 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, Fact Sheet: Department of Labor Proposes Rule to Address Conflicts of 
Interest in Retirement Advice, Saving Middle-Class Families Billions of Dollars Every Year, http://
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regulatory obligations of those advisors.78 The rule classifies anyone 
who provides investment advice for a fee in connection with a 
retirement plan as a fiduciary. As a fiduciary, an advisor must meet 
designated compliance requirements and is prohibited from engaging 
in specified transactions or using designated fee structures.79 Although 
the final rule has been described as substantially “watered down” from 
a prior proposal that had been heavily criticized,80 the new regulatory 
requirements will increase the cost of professional advice by making 
compliance more burdensome and imposing greater liability risk. This 
increased cost may, in turn, reduce access by ordinary investors to 
professional advice in connection with retirement planning.81  
Critics expressed particular concern about the potential effect of 
the fiduciary rule on the provision of investor education. The DOL 
designed its response to protect employers that offer investor 
education programs. In addition to containing an extensive discussion 
of investor education—which, pursuant to the rule, does not constitute 
 
www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsconflictsofinterest.html [https://perma.cc/UPE2-78VG] (quoting 
Feb. 23, 2015 statement by President Obama). 
 78. Employee Benefits Security Administration, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be 
codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550). 
 79. Advisors can engage in certain prohibited transactions if they comply with the 
requirements of the Best Interest Contract Exemption. 29 C.F.R. § 2550 (2015). 
 80. See Ashlea Ebeling, DOL Issues Final Fiduciary Rule, Does It Fall Short?, FORBES  
(Apr. 7, 2016, 4:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2016/04/07/dol-issues-final-
fiduciary-rule-does-it-fall-short/#5ad0928c548e [https://perma.cc/QEU7-HGAV]. 
 81. See Tara Siegel Bernard, ‘Customers First’ to Become the Law in Retirement 
Investing, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/your-money/new-rules
-for-retirement-accounts-financial-advisers.html [https://perma.cc/9NNC-87EE] (quoting Jules 
Gaudreau, president of the National Association of Insurance and Financial Advisors, as 
expressing concern that “such a complex rule will result in higher costs and reduced access to 
advice, service and products for retirement savers”). Preliminary studies of a somewhat different 
regulatory reform adopted in the United Kingdom found evidence of a “guidance gap” of 43 
million investors who may be unable or willing to obtain professional financial guidance because 
of the new regulatory restrictions. ANDREW CLARE CASS CONSULTING, THE GUIDANCE  
GAP: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE UK’S POST-RDR SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT LANDSCAPE  
1 (2013), http://www.cassknowledge.com/sites/default/files/article-attachments/the-guidance-gap.
pdf [https://perma.cc/QW4Y-K4RV]; see also Andrew Clare, Steve Thomas, Omal Walgama & 
Christina Makris, Challenge and Opportunity: The Impact of the RDR on the UK’s  
Market for Financial Advice 16 (Cass Bus. Sch. & BNY Mellon, Draft No. 4, 2013), http://
www.cassknowledge.com/sites/default/files/article-attachments/bny-mellon-rdr-cass-knowledge.
pdf [https://perma.cc/YP6G-CTXP] (concluding that the regulatory initiative will result in a focus 
on high value clients and thus decrease the number of overall advisors). UK regulators conducted 
a review and issued recommendations aimed at addressing this guidance gap. HM  
TREASURY FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., FINANCIAL ADVICE MARKET REVIEW: FINAL REPORT 
(2016), https://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/financial-advice-market-review-final-report 
[https://perma.cc/FAA4-A2T4]. 
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the provision of investment advice82—the DOL adopting release 
explains, “[T]he fact that employers do not generally receive 
compensation in connection with their educational communications 
provides employers with a high level of confidence that their 
educational activities would not constitute investment advice under the 
rule.”83 
Despite the carve-out for investor education, the fiduciary rule 
will increase the costs of providing investment advice in connection 
with retirement plans. The effect of reduced access on ordinary 
investors and their ability to make appropriate investment decisions is 
unclear. As one report shows, the majority of retail investors seek 
professional advice for  
savings plans.84 There is also evidence that individuals with access 
to a financial advisor are better long-term investors.85 There are many 
reasons for this, but one possibility is that professional advice bridges 
the knowledge gap between ordinary investors and professional 
advisors. This Article explores this knowledge gap. 
II.  STUDY DESIGN AND FINANCIAL LITERACY INDEX 
A. Study Participants 
We conducted our study with two separate groups. Our first group 
consisted of people who signed up through Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) to participate in internet-based research for compensation.86 
In all, 146 MTurk subjects participated in the study.87 We report 
demographic information on the full group in Table 1. 
 
 82. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3–.21(b)(iv) (2015). 
 83. Employee Benefits Security Administration, 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946, 20,976 (Apr. 8, 2016) 
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550).  
 84. WYMAN, INC., supra note 20, at 6. 
 85. Id.; see also VANGUARD, THE VALUE OF MANAGED ACCOUNT ADVICE 1  
(2015), http://institutional.vanguard.com/iam/pdf/VMAPRES.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JBN-9M58] 
(finding that six of ten long-term retirement investors increased their savings by using professional 
advice). 
 86. See Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 1, at 631–32 (describing MTurk). 
 87. We began with an MTurk “HIT” requesting 150 participants. In Qualtrics, our survey 
software, we received 150 fully completed surveys and 22 partially completed surveys. We 
removed the data for completed surveys that did not match a submitted MTurk HIT ID, partially 
completed surveys, and completed surveys that had an ID or IP address that matched a partially 
completed survey, which resulted in our final count of 146 participants. All participant data 
removals were chosen based only on this information and completed before and independent of 
any data analysis. 
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Table 1. MTurk Respondents’ Demographic Variables 
Male  58% 
Median Age  33 
Four Year College Degree or m=More  55% 
Employed Full or Part Time  66% 
Annual Household Income <$50,000  55% 
Our second group consisted of professional advisors. With the 
cooperation of FINRA, we made our survey available to employees of 
FINRA firms on a voluntary basis. The survey was accessible through 
the FINRA compliance website via a link labeled “Participate–
Wharton Investment Strategies Study.” 
We received responses from sixty professional advisors.88 Each of 
these advisors was either a registered investment advisor, a registered 
representative (broker), or both. We report demographic information 
on the professional advisors in Table 2 below. 
Table 2. FINRA Respondents’ Demographic Variables 
Male                              79% 
Median Age                              46 
Four Year College Degree or More                              96% 
Median Time on Survey                              23 minutes 
Median Number Funds Invested In                              4 
Although we attempted to make the MTurk and professional-
advisor tasks as similar as possible, there are multiple reasons these 
groups are not directly comparable. They received the survey at slightly 
different times.89 The instructions were about giving advice to a 
hypothetical client (the advisors) instead of about how to make 
personal allocations (the MTurk subjects). Most of the individuals who 
accessed the survey via MTurk completed the survey, whereas many 
advisors only looked at the survey instructions or completed the 
allocation without finishing the task.90 Thus, the advisors who did 
 
 88. We included all survey responses that were fully completed. We did not include eighty-
two additional surveys were only partially completed. (Twenty-two of these completed the 
allocation, but not the following questionnaire. The remainder did not complete even the 
allocation.) 
 89. The advisor responses were gathered between February and September of 2015. The 
MTurk responses were gathered in November of 2015.  
 90. See supra note 88.  
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complete the survey may be especially interested in volunteering to 
perform this kind of task. Despite these differences, we still believe this 
study provides insight by making cautious comparisons about how the 
two groups approach the task of retirement investing, their choices, 
and their knowledge levels. Nonetheless, we offer these cautious 
comparisons between the groups in order to suggest the effect of 
knowledge and expertise on investment strategies. 
B. Study Design 
We examined financial literacy in the context of a specific 
investment decision—choosing investments in a 401(k) plan. Drawing 
upon our prior work, we constructed a web-based interface that 
allowed subjects to allocate a hypothetical ten thousand dollars among 
ten investment options as part of a 401(k) plan. The MTurk subjects 
were told to assume that they were not going to retire for at least thirty 
years and that an algorithm would simulate their portfolio’s value at 
the end of thirty years based on their investment choices. They were 
incentivized to maximize the value of their portfolio by being told that 
at the end of the study they would be paid a percentage of their 
portfolio’s value at year thirty. 
For the professional advisors, we slightly revised the study 
instructions to ask the subjects to allocate ten thousand dollars on 
behalf of a hypothetical single client thirty years old, with no children, 
a lower-middle-class income, and no substantial outside savings or 
investments. The professional advisors were not paid for completing 
the study. They saw the portfolio’s total value at the end of thirty years 
on the final page of the survey. 
We offered the subjects ten investment options that included a 
bank savings account, a money market fund, and eight domestic mutual 
funds (a target-date fund, two fixed-income funds, two equity index 
funds, and three actively managed equity funds). Each of the options 
was modeled upon a real-world example. We provided our subjects 
with an allocation page that contained a list of all ten funds and their 
fund category. 
The study offered the subjects the opportunity to obtain more 
detailed information by user-initiated clicking through a series of links. 
Clicking on a fund name provided the subject with a brief description 
of the fund and four additional links labeled performance, holdings, 
risk, and fees, as shown in Figure 1 below. Clicking any of the four links 
revealed simplified fund-specific information derived from the 
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attributes of the real-world analog on which the fund was based. The 
click-through structure allowed us to track the precise information 
accessed by each subject. 
Figure 1. 
 After our subjects completed the allocation exercise, we asked 
them to answer a series of questions to assess their attitudes about 
investing, their objectives while completing their allocation, their 
financial literacy, and to collect demographic information.91 The 
MTurk subjects and professional advisors were given the same 
investment alternatives and asked to answer the same questionnaire 
following their allocation decision.92 
At the end of the questionnaire we calculated a predicted value of 
the selected portfolio.93 To simulate the performance of each of the 
investment options, we used a predetermined algorithm that relied on 
basic assumptions about the long-term return for each asset class and 
adjusted those returns to reflect the quoted fees of each of the options 
in our menu.94 The value of a subject’s portfolio was heavily influenced 
 
 91. We describe the financial literacy analysis in more detail below.  
 92. We asked the subject pools slightly different employment questions. We asked the 
professional advisors for information about their current role and their time in the financial 
industry, whereas we asked the MTurk subjects about their employment status. 
 93. The value of a subject’s portfolio was only disclosed to that subject after the subject 
completed the study. Professional advisors saw the value on the final page of the survey they 
completed; the MTurk subjects saw the value at the conclusion of the full study. 
 94. Our algorithm calculated returns according to asset class and provided similar returns 
for all funds within a single asset class, based on the theory that, over time, a fund is likely to 
revert to the market rate of return. We then adjusted each fund’s return to reflect the disclosed 
fee, so that funds with higher fees yielded lower returns. Our algorithm provided subjects with 
higher payouts for choosing equity over fixed income (the equity risk premium) and with higher 
payouts for choosing funds with lower fees. See, e.g., Paul A. Merriman, The Best Investment 
Advice Ever, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 5, 2014, 1:13 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-
best-investment-advice-ever-2014-06-11 [https://perma.cc/2BQ5-WUKN] (discussing the equity 
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by the subject’s investment decisions. A portfolio that was invested 100 
percent in the FDIC-insured bank account would have had a value of 
$13,478.49 at the end of the thirty-year period. A portfolio that was 
invested 100 percent in our low-cost equity index fund would have had 
a value of $132,676.78. Accordingly, our subjects’ investment choices 
determined the value of their portfolios, and (for the MTurk subjects) 
their own incentive payment, and the difference between the worst 
choice and the best was an order of magnitude. 
We evaluated our subjects’ performance in the allocation exercise 
in several different ways as described below. Significantly, we were 
interested in a number of aspects of the decisionmaking process, 
including the information accessed by our subjects, their ability to 
compare alternative investment options, and their effort to minimize 
fees. 
Financial literacy is not, of course, the only factor that is likely to 
influence the quality of a subject’s investment decisions. To address the 
role of other factors, we collected demographic data as well as 
information on education, income, and investment experience. 
Prompted by findings from our earlier work, we also considered the 
role of risk tolerance.95 Policymakers and the media have highlighted 
the billions of dollars of “lost returns” investors sacrifice by paying 
excessive fees, but because higher equity exposure is associated with 
increased returns,96 those losses are potentially dwarfed by the revenue 
sacrificed by excessive risk aversion. 
Although economists often treat risk preferences as stable, we 
hypothesize that retail investors may be limited in their ability to 
evaluate risk and that increased financial literacy or professional advice 
may play a role in increasing investor risk tolerance. We therefore 
explore the role of risk tolerance independently by asking subjects to 
 
risk premium). Given the thirty-year time frame of the study, we did not reduce the value of 
portfolios that incorporated a higher level of risk, recognizing that the literature on the 
appropriate level of risk for investments with a long time horizon is complex. See, e.g., Christian 
Gollier & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Horizon Length and Portfolio Risk, 24 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 195, 196 (2002) (noting that the degree to which the investment horizon should 
affect the riskiness of one’s investment is a “key question” that remains “unresolved”).  
 95. See Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 1, at 645 (observing that results from an earlier 
study suggested that study participants had a poor understanding of the objectives behind 
retirement investing).  
 96. See generally IAN AYRES & BARRY NALEBUFF, LIFECYCLE INVESTING: A NEW, SAFE, 
AND AUDACIOUS WAY TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR RETIREMENT PORTFOLIO 
(2010) (describing how the leveraged investments increase portfolio returns).  
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answer a question about the extent to which minimizing risk was a high 
priority. 
C. The Financial Literacy Index 
We measured financial literacy in several ways. We developed a 
series of nineteen questions about financial knowledge, based on 
refinements from a fifteen-question index that we tested in a prior 
MTurk study.97 Our questions explore the difference and attributes of 
stocks, bonds, and mutual funds as well as the expected long-term 
performance of equity and fixed income and the meaning of 
diversification. The questions varied in complexity and were designed 
to test financial knowledge that is specific to the asset-allocation 
decision.98 
We also included four questions that tested subject numeracy.99 
Finally, we included the three questions used by Lusardi and Mitchell 
to test financial literacy. We report the responses to the financial 
literacy questions in Table 3 below. 
  
 
 97. See Jill E. Fisch, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Kristin Firth, Investor Financial Literacy in the 
Workplace 15–23 (Univ. of Pa. Faculty Scholarship Working Paper No. 1590, 2015), 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2591&context=faculty_scholarship 
[https://perma.cc/SLN9-MGZC] (reporting results from use of the fifteen-point index). 
 98. To evaluate the reliability of our nineteen-question scale, we calculated Cronbach’s 
Alpha. Cronbach’s Alpha calculates the correlation of items in a survey and is one measure of the 
survey’s reliability. See L.J. Cronbach, Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of Tests, 16 
PSYCHOMETRIKA 297, 297 (1951) (developing and defending Cronbach’s alpha as a measure of 
reliability). For the nineteen-point scale, Cronbach’s alpha is 0.72, which is in the range of what is 
considered reliable. See, e.g., Mohsen Tavakol & Reg Dennick, Making Sense of Cronbach’s 
Alpha, 2 INT’L J. MED. EDUC. 53, 54 (2011) (noting that different reports suggest an acceptable 
value of Cronbach’s alpha is between .70 and .95). 
 99. We test numeracy using four questions about the effect of compounding and 
incorporating increasing degrees of complexity.  
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Table 3. Quiz Performance, by Item, for Each Subject Pool 
Question 
MTurk 
Percent 
Correct 
FINRA 
Percent 
Correct 
MC1: Best returns from stocks  63% 98% 
MC2: Stock = own part of company  89% 98% 
MC3: Bond = lend money to company 80% 98% 
MC4: Safest bond is treasury 87% 100% 
MC5: Interest rates go up, bond prices go down 52% 100% 
MC6: Mutual funds pool with other investors 73% 100% 
MC7: Fund balanced for retirement fund is target-date 
fund 
53% 100% 
MC8: Relationship between risk and returns in long run 
is positive 
48% 73% 
MC9: Longer time horizon, take on more risk 69% 100% 
TF10: Index fund tracks market index  90% 98% 
TF11: Possible to lose money in bond 61% 100% 
TF12: Professional managed funds do better 31% 70% 
TF13: Index funds vary based on manager experience 35% 68% 
TF14: Possible to lose money in mutual fund 89% 100% 
TF15: Expenses do not vary among mutual funds 78% 98% 
TF16: Diversification reduces variability 44% 67% 
TF17: Difference between bank and money market is 
FDIC insurance 74% 82% 
TF18: Mutual funds less diversified than individual stocks 78% 97% 
TF19: Target dates cheaper than individual funds 30% 46% 
N1: Return in 2 years 61% 78% 
N2: Return in 30 years 38% 75% 
N3: Fees paid in 30 years 42% 50% 
N4: Fees paid in 30 years 35% 42% 
LM1: Compounding 90% 98% 
LM2: Inflation and Savings 84% 98% 
LM3: Safety of Stocks vs. Mutual Funds 80% 96% 
Mean 19-point score  12.3 16.9 
Mean Numeracy Score 1.8 2.4 
Mean LM score 2.5 2.9 
Note: MC – multiple choice, TF – true false, N – numeracy, LM – Lusardi & Mitchell questions. 
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As expected, the table indicates that on every measure the 
professional advisors are more financially literate than the MTurk 
subjects. We found relatively little variance in the level of financial 
literacy among the professional advisors. Across the board, our 
professional subjects answered virtually all of the financial literacy 
questions accurately, generating a correct response rate of about 90 
percent, as opposed to the MTurk subjects who answered correctly 
only about 65 percent of the time on a true–false and multiple-choice 
test. All but one of the professional advisors scored fourteen or higher 
on the nineteen-question scale. Only three of our sixty professional 
advisors got any of the Lusardi and Mitchell questions wrong. We turn, 
in the next Part, to exploring the implications of that knowledge gap by 
examining the relationship between financial literacy and investment 
performance. 
III.  STUDY RESULTS 
A. Financial Literacy and Investment Performance 
Our first objective was to evaluate the role of financial literacy in 
investment performance. To analyze the effect of financial literacy, we 
divided the MTurk sample into two groups—high- and low-literacy 
subjects—based on their performance on our nineteen-point literacy 
scale. The dividing line was at the median score of thirteen. Subjects 
with a financial literacy score of less than thirteen were categorized as 
low literacy and those getting thirteen or more items correct were 
categorized as high literacy. Table 4 provides more detail on the two 
groups. Note that the median literacy level in the high-literacy MTurk 
group equaled the bottom score (except for one outlier) of the entire 
professional-advisor subject pool: 
Table 4. MTurk Financial Literacy by Group 
 Min. 
First 
Quartile Median Mean 
Third 
Quartile Max. 
Low-
literacy 
MTurk 
6.0 9.0 10.0 10.07 11.0 12.0 
High-
literacy 
MTurk 
13.0 13.0 14.0 14.54 15.25 18.0 
 As noted above, we evaluated our subjects’ performance in the 
allocation exercise in several different ways. First, because we 
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instructed our subjects to maximize the size of their hypothetical 
retirement portfolio, we looked at the degree to which their success 
was correlated with financial literacy. Because we constructed an 
algorithm that calculated portfolio value and because that algorithm 
depended on certain assumptions about asset allocation and return, we 
were concerned that the constructed portfolio value did not reflect a 
sufficiently objective measure of decisionmaking quality. 
We therefore considered several alternative metrics for evaluating 
performance. One of these was the amount invested by our subjects in 
Fund D, the low-cost index fund.100 Based on the information provided 
to our subjects, Fund D was designed to dominate the other investment 
options over every dimension except risk.101 The study thus captures 
the viewpoint seemingly reflected by current DOL policy that, for the 
average investor, the most appropriate equity option is a low-cost 
passively managed fund.102 
Much commentary focuses on the role of disclosure in improving 
investor performance.103 A persistent question in this literature 
concerns the degree to which investors search for and use the 
information that is available to them.104 To address this concern, our 
study design requires our subjects to click on a link to access each 
specific piece of information about the investment alternatives. The 
web interface enabled us to track every piece of information that a 
subject accessed. Because subjects could only identify relevant fund 
characteristics by clicking on the links, we treat the number of clicks as 
another outcome variable, reasoning that only investors who obtained 
the information that was provided could distinguish among the 
 
 100. We consider in more detail below our subjects’ choice among the ten investment 
alternatives. 
 101. We consider risk separately, as discussed below. 
 102. See, e.g., Matt Levine, Labor Department Wants to Tweak Your Retirement  
Plan, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Apr. 15, 2015, 3:43 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/ 
2015-04-15/labor-department-wants-to-tweak-your-retirement-plan [https://perma.cc/85MS-M8
BQ] (describing the DOL’s “bias toward passive investing”). 
 103. See, e.g., Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S–K, 81 Fed. Reg. 
23,916, 23,917 (Apr. 22, 2016) (soliciting input on whether the existing disclosures mandated by 
Regulation S–K “continue to provide the information that investors need to make informed 
investment and voting decisions”). 
 104. See, e.g., John Beshears, James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, How Does 
Simplified Disclosure Affect Individuals’ Mutual Fund Choices?, in EXPLORATIONS IN THE 
ECONOMICS OF AGING 75, 76–77 (David A. Wise ed., 2011) (reporting study results finding that 
providing a fund’s Summary Prospectus does not affect portfolio choices); Kristina Rennekamp, 
Processing Fluency and Investors’ Reactions to Disclosure Readability, 50 J. ACCT. RES. 1319, 1343 
(2012) (finding that investors respond more to readable disclosures). 
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investment alternatives. A similar proxy is provided by the amount of 
time our subjects spent on the exercise.105 Finally, incorporating our 
earlier research on the importance of fees,106 we also considered the 
average fees paid by our subjects.107 
Table 5 reports the differences among subject groups. Financial 
literacy was highly associated with performance. The high-literacy 
MTurk subjects selected portfolios that were worth an average of 
$21,000 more than the low-literacy MTurk subjects. Similarly, the 
professional advisors generated portfolios worth an average of 20 
percent more than those of the MTurk subjects, a difference that 
translates into an average of more than $16,000 on a $10,000 initial 
investment. Most starkly, the professional advisors selected portfolios 
that were worth about $27,000 more than the low-literacy MTurk 
subjects, a difference of 33 percent. 
Table 5. Outcome Variables by Group 
 Low Literacy High Literacy Professional 
Advisors 
Returns 
70,389.78 91,575.08 97,166.02 
t=5.94, df=142.5, p<.001 t=1.67, df=127.7, p=0.097 
Cheap Index Fund 
Investment 
8.1 19.3 27.5 
t=4.14, df=84.2, p<.001 t=1.92, df=116, p=0.058 
Fees Paid108 
.77 .69 .63 
t=3.09, df=104.7, p=0.003 t=1.45, df=124.8, p=0.15 
Total Clicks 
17.9 29.0 25.6 
t=2.97, df=139, p=0.004 t=0.74, df=118.7, p=0.462 
 Financial literacy was also associated with our other outcome 
variables. The financially literate subjects allocated more money to the 
cheap index fund, paid lower fees, and accessed more information in 
connection with the allocation decision as measured by number of 
 
 105. Because of design limitations in the survey format, time is a noisy variable, both because 
our subjects could have been doing other things during the survey and because, for the MTurk 
subjects, the MTurk structure included a time limit after which the study expired, preventing 
subjects who spent too long from completing the survey.  
 106. See Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 1, at 638–39. 
 107. Because our study did not charge a fee for the bank account, it was possible to minimize 
fees by investing exclusively in the bank account.  
 108. To calculate fees paid, we omitted the cash account.  
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clicks. Our professional advisors outperformed the high-literacy 
MTurk subjects along those dimensions as well except for clicks.109 
These differences could be explained by factors other than 
financial literacy. Indeed, an extensive literature looks at the role of 
various demographic factors as well as experience in predicting 
investment performance. We explore the role of these factors in two 
ways. First, we ran a regression to explore the relationship between 
demographic characteristics and financial literacy. The results are 
shown in Table 6 below: 
Table 6. Regression: DV=FL Score 19 
 
Experience Score 
(1) 
Demographics 
(2) 
Experience Score 
and Demographics 
(3) 
Intercept 
12.26*** 
(0.21) 
11.44*** 
(0.33) 
11.48*** 
(0.32) 
Experience 
0.85*** 
(0.21) 
 0.64** 
(0.22) 
Age 
 0.48* 
(0.22) 
0.41 
(0.21) 
Male 
 1.35** 
(0.44) 
1.3** 
(0.42) 
Education 
 0.66** 
(0.23) 
0.56* 
(0.22) 
Income  
 0.09 
(0.23) 
-0.1 
(0.23) 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.092 
 
0.114 
 
0.158 
F-Test 
 
F(1,145)=15.83 
 
F(4,139)=5.61 
 
F(5,138)=6.37 
p-value 
 
<.001 
 
<.001 
 
<.001 
n=144. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 All noncategorical independent variables have been 
scaled by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. 
 As Table 6 shows, financial literacy is associated with gender 
(males are more financially literate) and investment experience, and is 
somewhat correlated with education. These findings are predictable 
and consistent with the existing literature.110 
 
 109. The difference in clicks may be explained by the professional advisors’ greater familiarity 
with the task. 
 110. See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi, What’s Behind the Financial Literacy Gender Gap?, WALL 
STREET J.: THE EXPERTS (Nov. 2, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2015/11/02/whats-
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Results from our earlier research suggest the independent 
importance of risk tolerance in investing behavior. We analyze risk 
tolerance in this study using a self-reported seven-point scale of 
agreement with the statement that minimizing risk was an important 
priority (reverse coded so that a higher number is a higher risk 
tolerance). 
Table 7. Risk and Financial Literacy 
 Low Literacy High Literacy Professional 
Advisors 
Mean Risk Tolerance 2.6 3.7 3.8 
 Overall, the MTurk subjects indicated a lower risk tolerance than 
the FINRA subjects, and risk tolerance was associated with financial 
literacy. The two variables are highly correlated (r=.35) and the 
difference on risk score between low- and high-literacy MTurk 
participants is highly significant (t=4.1, p=.000). Risk tolerance was not 
different between high-literacy subjects and professional advisors. 
We refine this analysis by running a basic regression in which our 
dependent variable is financial performance, measured by portfolio 
value. We include financial literacy demographic controls, and controls 
for risk tolerance and the numeracy score. 
  
 
behind-the-financial-literacy-gender-gap [https://perma.cc/4MUF-9LZ] (reporting study results 
showing that there is a persistent gender gap in financial literacy). 
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Table 8. Regression: DV=Return 
 
FL Score 
(1) 
FL Score and 
Demographics 
(2) 
All Scores and 
Demographics 
(3) 
Intercept 
80766.3*** 
(1770.4) 
81050.8*** 
(2825.2) 
81003.4*** 
(2679.8) 
FL Score 19 
11065*** 
(1776.4) 
10797.7*** 
(1949.3) 
7034.8** 
(2094.3) 
Numeracy Score 
  2519.3 
(1815.1) 
Risk Score 
  8208.6*** 
(1836.3) 
Experience 
  948.4 
(1908) 
Age 
 -578.1 
(1868.6) 
-1237.8 
(1815.3) 
Male 
 -52.6 
(3824.3) 
-706.6 
(3619.4) 
Education 
 2860.6 
(1978.6) 
2115.1 
(1918.7) 
Income  
 530.4 
(1921) 
947.2 
(1907.9) 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.206 
 
0.21 
 
0.305 
F-Test 
 
F(1,145)=38.8 
 
F(5,138)=8.62 
 
F(8,132)=8.67 
p-value 
 
<.001 
 
<.001 
 
<.001 
n=144. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 All noncategorical independent variables have been 
scaled by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. 
 As Table 8 shows, financial literacy is a strong predictor of better 
performance on the experimental task as measured in simulated 
returns on investment, holding the demographic variables constant. In 
other words, financial literacy is not just a function of gender, 
investment experience, or risk tolerance. Additionally, although 
numeracy—the ability to solve math problems related to investing, 
specifically compounding—is highly correlated with financial 
literacy,111 numeracy is not independently predictive of success in 
 
 111. As expected, our independent variables are highly correlated with one another. Our 
financial literacy score is also highly correlated with the LM-literacy score. In unreported 
regressions, we find that both indices have independent explanatory power. This data is on file 
with the Duke Law Journal. 
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navigating the investment choices. When other variables are accounted 
for, numeracy has no relationship to investment decisions. Finally, for 
the MTurk subjects, risk attitude was one of the most significant 
predictors of performance even after accounting for financial literacy 
more generally. Table 8 shows that higher risk tolerance is associated 
with a significant increase in returns in the investment task even 
holding financial literacy constant. 
We note that the relationship between risk tolerance and 
investment performance is predictable—the equity risk premium 
historically has compensated investors for their willingness to bear 
additional risk. In the context of retirement savings, the effects are 
compounded. As a result, risk aversion is likely to penalize investors 
substantially. This finding is consistent with the responses of the 
professional advisors, who noted that the equity risk premium coupled 
with the long-term nature of the investment counseled in favor of a 
substantial exposure to equity. 
Generally speaking, the professional advisors had financial 
literacy scores that were uniformly high with little differentiation or 
predictive power. We did separately analyze the group we call the 
“uber-high” respondents, all of whom scored either eighteen or 
nineteen on the nineteen-point scale. They had marginally significant 
higher returns by our measure of returns (t=1.80, p=.081) and paid 
noticeably less in fees, averaging fifty basis points rather than sixty-nine 
(t=2.69, p=.013). One advantage of using a more fine-grained financial 
literacy measure is that it permits us to differentiate meaningfully even 
within a largely homogenous population. 
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B. Asset-Allocation Analysis 
Table 9 shows the allocation of funds for each subject group. 
Table 9. Asset Allocation, MTurk and FINRA, Means and Medians 
Fund (fee) 
 
MTurk Low 
Literacy 
MTurk High 
Literacy FINRA 
A: Target-Date Fund (.89%) 11.4 [10] 12.8 [5] 17.8 [10] 
B: Fixed-Income Fund (.89%) 9.8 [8] 4.7 [0] 5.1 [0] 
C: Fixed-Income Fund (.22%) 10.9 [10] 9.4 [5] 6.1 [0] 
D: Cheap Index Fund (.17%) 8 [10] 19.3 [10] 27.5 [20] 
E: Dominated Index Fund (.67%) 7.1 [7] 10.6 [8] 11.1 [0] 
F: Managed Fund (.67%) 7.8 [10] 10.7 [10] 12.3 [10] 
G: Expensive Managed Fund (1.25%) 11.5 [10] 13.6 [10] 10.2 [5] 
H: Managed Fund (.62%) (closet 
index) 
10.4 [10] 11.4 [10] 7 [0] 
I: Money Market (.16%) 12 [5] 3.9 [0] 1.6 [0] 
J: Cash (no fee) 11.1 [9] 3.5 [0] 1.3 [0] 
Note: Means are the first number in each cell. Medians are provided in square brackets. 
As noted above, one of the challenges in evaluating retirement 
investing is setting an appropriate benchmark—that is, normatively 
evaluating a given investment strategy. To limit this concern, our study 
focuses largely on asset-allocation decisions and on our subjects’ ability 
to make rational allocation decisions without seeking to identify which 
choices are necessarily optimal. We consider three aspects of the 
allocation decision: diversification, investment in dominated funds, and 
investment in cash and cash equivalents. 
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1. Diversification.  In prior research, we found evidence of naive 
diversification.112 Subjects did not appear to “pick [the best] funds” but 
instead spread their investment across the full range of alternatives.113 
We observed variation in this pattern, however, and flagged the 
question of what investor characteristics explained naive 
diversification as a subject for future study.114 In this project we 
explored the question in more detail. 
As Figures 2–4 demonstrate, our investor groups differed 
dramatically with respect to the extent to which they engaged in naive 
diversification. The low-literacy MTurk subjects invested in an average 
of 7.2 funds, and fully 44 percent of them invested in all ten funds. At 
the extreme, twenty-one of the MTurk subjects invested 10 percent of 
their portfolio in each of the ten options. 
Figure 2. Low-Literacy MTurk Subjects, Percent of Subjects Investing 
in Each Number of Funds 
 
 
 112. Naive diversification or confused diversification involves using a simple rule of thumb, 
such as the 1/n heuristic, rather than diversifying in accordance with maximizing a particular utility 
function. See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined 
Contribution Saving Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79, 79 (2001) (explaining the concept of naive 
diversification). 
 113. Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 1, at 636.  
 114. Id. 
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The high-literacy MTurk subjects invested in far fewer funds as 
shown in Figure 3. The average number of funds they invested in was 
4.8, and only 15 percent invested in all ten fund options. 
Figure 3. High-Literacy MTurk Subjects, Percent of Subjects Investing 
in Each Number of Funds 
 
The professional advisors were even more selective as shown in 
Figure 4. They invested in an average of 4.3 funds, and only 5 percent 
(three subjects) invested in all ten funds. Not one of the professional 
advisors engaged in the 1/10 investment strategy of allocating 10 
percent of their portfolio to each of the ten investment options. All 
these differences are highly significant. 
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Figure 4. FINRA Subjects, Percent of Subjects Investing in Each 
Number of Funds 
 
Unlike the MTurk subjects, the professional advisors appeared to 
recognize that the allocation task involved evaluating the relative 
merits of the allocation options. Several of the professional advisors 
specifically identified the duplication among the fund options and 
made a clear decision to choose the better among similar 
alternatives.115 As discussed below, our fund menu in this study 
contained dominated funds that investors should have rejected in favor 
of alternatives. Accordingly, naive diversification reduced investor 
returns. 
2. Dominated Funds.  In their responses, the professional advisors 
highlighted the importance of asset allocation in retirement planning. 
Our study was designed, in a simplified way, to test the extent to which 
subjects were making intelligent asset-allocation choices. The most 
explicit test of asset allocation was our inclusion of two S&P 500 index 
funds that were identical in every dimension except fees.116 
 
 115. As one subject explained: “2 funds seemed enough as F, G & H look the same as do B & 
C and D & E.” (survey on file with the authors). 
 116. The reported past performance of the high-cost index fund was also lower, reflecting the 
cost associated with the higher fee. 
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We found substantial differences among our investors. Overall, 
the differences corresponded to financial literacy; 63 percent of the 
high-literacy MTurk subjects invested nothing in the expensive index 
fund, but only 27 percent of low-literacy MTurk subjects invested zero. 
Oddly, 42 percent of FINRA subjects invested some amount of their 
portfolio in the expensive index fund, perhaps because they were 
choosing by category rather than cost. Those who invested in the 
dominated index fund were largely subjects who had not clicked on the 
fees button at all. 
We presented our subjects with two additional dominated funds. 
One dominated fund was a closet index fund—a fund that purported 
to be actively managed and charged a corresponding fee—which had 
holdings and returns that were virtually identical to those of the index 
funds.117 The other dominated fund was a fixed-income fund that 
dominated the other fixed-income fund in terms of risk, fees, and past 
performance, although, because the funds were modeled upon real-
world options, the holdings of the two were not identical. 
In both cases, the FINRA subjects were better than the MTurk 
subjects at identifying the dominated funds, although the FINRA 
subjects did not avoid those funds entirely. Approximately 63 percent 
of the FINRA subjects invested nothing in the closet index fund, 
compared to 33 percent of the MTurk subjects. Similarly 44 percent of 
the MTurk subjects invested nothing in the dominated fixed-income 
fund, and 67 percent of the FINRA subjects invested zero in that fund. 
These findings are only suggestive at this point, because there are 
multiple possible explanations for failure to invest in any given fund. 
But the first look does suggest a kind of menu effect that has been 
identified in work on the subject of choice architecture and that should 
be of concern to regulators.118 As we discuss further below, the 
implication of this finding may be a need for enhanced employer 
obligations with respect to plan design. Specifically, the current 
regulatory emphasis on maximizing employee choice among 
 
 117. See Fisch, supra note 13, at 2018 (explaining closet index funds). 
 118. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3 (2008) (explaining the concept of choice 
architecture); Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary R. Mottola, Stephen P. Utkus & Takeshi Yamaguchi, 
Default, Framing and Spillover Effects: The Case of Lifecycle Funds in 401(k) Plans 17  
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 15108, 2009), http://www.nber.org/
papers/w15108.pdf [https://perma.cc/P92T-Q6XF] (evaluating the introduction of target-date 
funds into the menu of retirement plans and finding that “expected default and framing effects[] 
can also have important unanticipated or spillover effects”).  
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investment alternatives may not provide employees with sufficient 
protection. 
C. Risk Aversion and Equity Allocation 
As noted above, we found that risk aversion played a substantial 
role in explaining differences in the value of our subjects’ portfolios. 
This result was, in part, a product of the fact that our valuation 
algorithm reflected a substantial risk premium. Our theory was that, 
over a thirty-year time horizon, investors are compensated for bearing 
the risk associated with equities and penalized, in terms of 
performance, for allocating their investments primarily into cash.119 
Additionally, because we offered investors a low-cost fixed-income 
fund option (and a target-date fund), even those investors who sought 
to minimize the risk of their portfolios had an investment alternative 
that should have dominated the cash and money market fund 
options.120 Within the framework of this study, we therefore viewed 
substantial allocations to both the cash and money market alternatives 
as costly mistakes. 
We found a dramatic difference between our subject groups with 
respect to this allocation choice as shown in Table 10 below. 
Table 10. Mean Investment Level – Cash and Money Market 
Fund 
 
Low-Literacy 
MTurk 
High-literacy 
MTurk 
Professional Advisors 
I: Money Market  12.0 4.0 1.6 
J: Cash  11.1 3.5 1.3 
 The allocation differences were consistent in our subjects’ 
understandings of the investment task. We asked all our subjects 
several open-ended questions designed to capture their intended 
investment strategy. Our professional-advisor subjects overwhelmingly 
both considered the allocation of their portfolio between debt and 
equity as an important consideration and, in considering that 
allocation, chose to invest the majority of the portfolio in equity—an 
 
 119. See, e.g., J. Bradford DeLong & Konstantin Magin, The U.S. Equity Return Premium: 
Past, Present, and Future, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 195 (2009) (observing an average historical 
equity risk premium of approximately 5 percent for investors with a twenty-year time horizon 
since 1901). 
 120. In the real world, investors might allocate a percentage of their portfolio to cash to take 
advantage of future buying opportunities. Because investors in our study were not permitted to 
make adjustments to their portfolios after the initial allocation, this motivation for allocating 
assets to cash should have been eliminated. 
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average of 80 percent.121 In support of this decision, they cited the long 
time frame over which the money would be invested and the historic 
equity premium. The high-literacy MTurk subjects provided a similar 
explanation stating that to maximize growth, a substantial investment 
in equity was required and that thirty years provided sufficient time to 
“ride out the storm.” In contrast, the low-literacy MTurk subjects 
described their investment objective in terms of safety and stability 
and, significantly, did not even address the applicable time horizon. 
The DOL has already shifted its regulatory approach to provide a 
nudge in favor of increased equity investing by, for example, 
authorizing employers to provide a target-date fund as a default 
option.122 Employers are not, however, compelled to do so; nor are they 
required to advise investors of the potential returns that they may 
sacrifice in an effort to minimize the riskiness of their portfolios. Our 
results highlight the potential cost of this policy as well as the value that 
may be realized through increasing investor risk tolerance. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
We document the importance of financial literacy in retirement 
investing—limited financial literacy is associated with poor investment 
decisionmaking. Importantly, however, we highlight the specific types 
of mistakes associated with limited financial literacy—low-literacy 
subjects failed even to review the applicable information about their 
investment options and, predictably, they engaged in naive 
diversification, failed to identify dominated funds, paid higher fees, and 
invested too much in cash and cash equivalents. Higher-literacy 
subjects, although imperfect, demonstrated far better performance 
across all these dimensions. Our results support the findings in prior 
research about the importance of financial literacy and offer reasons to 
question the viability of participant-directed investing as the primary 
vehicle for retirement savings. Whether or not investor performance 
 
 121. We considered allocations to the target-date fund, which was described as consisting of 
95 percent equity at the time of the study, as an allocation to equity.  
 122. Congress authorized automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans in the Pension Protection Act 
of 2006. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 902, 120 Stat. 780, 1033–39 
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 401). The DOL subsequently adopted regulations specifying the types of 
investment options that could be used as default options—so called qualified default investment 
alternatives (QDIAs). See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5 (2015). Target-date funds were included as 
QDIAs. See Leslie Wayne, Target-Date Mutual Funds May Miss Their Mark, N.Y. TIMES (June 
24, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/25/your-money/mutual-funds-and-etfs/25target.html 
[https://perma.cc/6V2G-JTFM] (describing the DOL “safe harbor” for target-date funds). 
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can be improved through disclosure, investor education, or other 
responses—a question we do not address in this study—the limitations 
of investors’ ability to protect themselves offer reasons to question the 
existing regulatory structure of 401(k) plans. In particular, our findings 
call into question the viability of relying on investor choice, in that 
investors may not be capable of making appropriate choices. 
One implication of our results is the need to consider more 
carefully the scope of employer obligations under ERISA. As noted 
above, under current law, an employer is largely relieved from 
fiduciary responsibility for an employee’s investment decisions as long 
as the employer provides a plan that meets a few minimum standards. 
At the same time, the law has generally viewed plans that offer a 
broader range of investment options more favorably.123 
Consistent with other research, our study shows, however, that the 
inclusion of inferior options, duplicative options, or simply too many 
choices may reduce the quality of employees’ decisions.124 Regulators 
may therefore consider requiring employers to undertake greater 
efforts to screen the quality of the investment options they offer rather 
than simply deferring to investor choice, based on the inability of 
investors to screen for themselves. Although the Supreme Court hinted 
at the need for greater employer responsibility in Tibble,125 the courts 
have generally been reluctant to second-guess an employer or plan 
sponsor’s selection of investment options.126 There are good reasons for 
this—as noted, the literature does not define the optimal investment 
strategy or options for retirement investing with precision, and after-
the-fact scrutiny is invariably subject to hindsight bias.127 Nonetheless, 
the performance of both the high-literacy MTurk subjects and the 
 
 123. See, e.g., Ayres & Curtis, supra note 18, at 1493 (“[A] menu that offers at least some good 
options, like the Hecker menu, will much more likely benefit from the protection of the safe 
harbor.”); Fisch & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 1, at 618–19. 
 124. See, e.g., Ayres & Curtis, supra note 18; Sheena S. Iyengar & Emir Kamenica, Choice 
Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset Allocation, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 530, 530–38 (2010). 
 125. See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1828 (2015).  
 126. See Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 746 F.3d 327, 338 (8th Cir. 2014) (vacating the district court’s 
finding of liability as reflecting improper “hindsight bias”). 
 127. See id. (explaining that the plan administrator’s choice of investment options is entitled 
to deference because “[w]hile it is easy to pick an investment option in retrospect (buy Apple Inc. 
at $7 a share in December 2000 and short Enron Corp. at $90 a share), selecting an investment 
beforehand is difficult”). 
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professional advisors suggests that more rigorous employer screening 
of fund options can eliminate some potential investor mistakes.128 
Indeed, an increased focus on this screening function may offer a 
valuable mechanism for mediating between the DOL’s concern about 
protecting vulnerable investors and the limitations imposed by the 
DOL’s strict fiduciary standard. Although the task of identifying the 
optimal investing strategy may be difficult, the responses by our 
professional-advisor subjects demonstrate a high degree of consensus 
about the factors that should inform both retirement-plan design and 
investor allocation decisions within a retirement plan. It is plausible 
that these factors could be incorporated into a legal standard, such as 
that imposed by FINRA’s suitability requirement, that could be 
imposed without the onerous liability exposure associated with 
expanded fiduciary status. The goal, after all, need not be the best 
possible investment decision, but rather reducing avoidable and costly 
investment mistakes. 
Within this goal, we infer an identifiable value associated with 
professional advice. The professional advisors were uniformly sensitive 
to the fact that the equity risk premium and the thirty-year time 
horizon of the allocation decision warranted substantial equity 
exposure—facts that the low-literacy investors seemed to be unaware 
of and that were in tension with the risk aversion of that subject group. 
Although the academic literature commonly views risk aversion as a 
stable preference,129 our study suggests that, at least in the investing 
context, some degree of risk aversion may, itself, be a mistake.130 
Access to professional advice may address this knowledge gap and 
enable low-literacy investors to make better retirement investing 
 
 128. See Veronika K. Pool, Clemens Sialm, & Irina Stefanescu, It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual 
Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans, 71 J. FIN. 1779, 1781 (2016) (suggesting that 401(k) plan 
providers are less likely to eliminate underperforming affiliated funds from plan menus and that 
this behavior affects the returns of plan participants).  
 129. See, e.g., Thomas Dohmen, David Huffman, & Jürgen Schupp, Individual Risk Attitudes: 
Measurement, Determinants and Behavioral Consequences, 9 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N. 522, 524 
(2011) (“In economics it is common to think of a single trait as governing risk-taking in all 
contexts . . . .”). 
 130. This possibility has long been suggested by studies showing greater risk tolerance by the 
wealthy. For an early example, see Richard A. Cohn, Individual Investor Risk Aversion and 
Investment Portfolio Composition, 30 J. FIN. 605, 618 (1975) (finding “a strong pattern of 
decreasing relative risk aversion”). 
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decisions. Our empirical results are consistent with anecdotal evidence 
of the value of professional advice.131 
This is not to say that the DOL’s concerns about the potential 
effect of advisors’ conflicts of interest are unfounded; our study design 
does not allow us to capture the potential effect of conflicts of interest 
on real-world advice.132 Moreover, even in the absence of problematic 
fee structures or other incentives, our professional advisors were not 
infallible: in some cases, their decisions were no better than those of 
the high-literacy MTurk subjects. Nonetheless, our study highlights the 
potential value of professional advice in enabling low-literacy 
investors, those most disadvantaged by a participant-directed model, 
to make more appropriate allocation decisions. Continued research is 
necessary to explore the extent to which the benefits from sound 
retirement investing outweigh the costs associated with professional 
advice. 
CONCLUSION 
Participant-directed retirement-savings plans are now the norm, 
but participants often lack the time and expertise to optimize their 
investment choices. As a result, investors make costly mistakes. 
Understanding the obstacles to better investment strategies is critical 
for the future financial independence of today’s workers. 
We have shed light on some of the reasons for poor investor 
decisionmaking. Primarily, we show that retail investors lack basic 
financial literacy and that financial literacy is a strong predictor of 
investment outcomes. 
We also document a striking knowledge gap that is reflected in 
substantial performance differences. Our study demonstrates low-
literacy investors make certain types of predictable mistakes that have 
substantial consequences for investment returns. Employers, through 
 
 131. See, e.g., Merriman, supra note 94 (stating that “[e]very DALBAR study that’s been 
released” suggests that “investors who use professional investment advice achieve higher long-
term returns than those who make their own decisions”). 
 132. The debate about the existence and effect of advisor conflicts of interest is beyond the 
scope of this Article. Because investors compensate their advisors and, because any compensation 
structure creates incentives, the real regulatory challenge is to create a compensation structure 
that most effectively aligns the interests of advisor and investor. See, e.g., Andrew Osterland, Is 
Your Financial Advisor Really Putting You Before Profit?, CNBC (Sept. 8, 2015, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/04/is-your-financial-advisor-really-putting-you-before-profit.html 
[https://perma.cc/YZ9J-VKKZ] (explaining how various common compensation structures can 
create conflicts of interest). 
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better plan design, and professional advisors, by encouraging low-
literacy investors to increase their risk tolerance, can mitigate some of 
the mistakes investors commonly make in retirement investing. 
Professional advice may also reduce investors’ discomfort with the 
decisionmaking process and lead to higher levels of participation and 
investment. 
